Thursday, December 29, 2011

SR/OOO literary theory: where ontology meets poetry (perhaps)


There's never a shortage of hybridism in contemporary literary criticism: and (if you'll allow the analogy) the root stock from which every new theory derives is, of course, the reigning poststructuralist critique of the text (literary or otherwise). The 'family resemblance' among them is unmistakable. I've recently discovered (thanks to John Bloomberg-Rissman) two very interesting appropriations of traditional postmodernist theory (with dashes of traditional ontology, Husserl & Heidegger) in the forms of Speculative Realist Literary Criticism (SR), and Object Oriented Ontology literary analysis (OOO). It's to the views of Levi Bryant and Eileen S.Joy, as I've discovered them in recent online discussions (here and here), we can turn for a full explication of the principles underlining their SR/OOO analyses of the 'text'. I believe the scope and limits of this new poststructuralist wave can be fairly simply elucidated.

Firstly, the common denominator in both is the emphasis on 'realism' or a strictly 'object-oriented' approach towards textuality. And of the text they say, oddly enough, there's nothing before it that can be said to transmit or codify traditional meaning, nothing ontologically nor historically prior from which discussion of 'textuality' can begin. (I'm inclined to read this as a wilful destruction of an Arnoldian humanist tradition). In Bryant's sense of inquiry, "content seems to come after." Presumably SR/OOO proponents will put something in its place: like the 'text' refashioned in some radically newer posthumanist (e.g., cybernetics, avant-garde poetics or systems theory) form or anything that serves as a theory's own operating system. Or perhaps even a more syncretistic view of humanism itself, such as that offered by Joy, will do the trick. For Joy 'humanism' as a critical concept is looking, Janus-like, at two directions at the same time, both a "troubling" and "heroic" one:
While we are fully aware that, historically, humanism and the human have a long and troubling history that implicates them in violent exclusions, as well as in deprivations and disenfranchisements of all sorts, we would also aver that humanism (of different philosophical varieties) has also been responsible for heroic acts of psychic and material sustenance, rescue and redemption, mutually-productive alliance and overcoming, and personal freedom. It is not a question of having some sort of scale that allows us to measure whether humanism has led to more atrocities than it has to social and other boons, but rather, of acknowledging that it has done both, in separate times and places, and simultaneously...
Secondly, now that the possibility of a traditional source criticism has been abolished, it looks as if we are living in a "Year O" world in which SR/OOO 'post-texts' potentially thrive. But to arrive here the hard work of literary analysis must begin. If the traditional (Arnoldian) text has been 'deracinated', certainly reduced to Joy's troubling sense of humanist tradition in general, anything we put in its place will have to both cover the Tradition deficit and put in its place a new 'Object-Oriented Ontology' of text and reading practice. It is a question of 'origins' in a  more radically 'speculative' sense. Bryant proposes an answer to the question, 'What is the ontological nature of things?' in his essay "The Ontic Principle: Outline of an Object-Oriented Ontology" (OP) in which he brackets (after Husserl) the very past of philosophical critique so that the look for origins, tentative in nature, may begin anew. As he says,
Faced with such a bewildering philosophical situation, what if we were to imagine ourselves as proceeding naïvely and pre-critically as first philosophers, pretending that the last three hundred years of philosophy had not taken place or that the proper point of entry into philosophical speculation was not the question of access?
Engagement with the world, textually and existentially, means to meet it and the material objects in it (like literary artifacts) as objects of open-ended enquiry. SR/OOO theorists are, Bryant says, "speculative, neo-pre-critical philosophers [who] will see any secure foundation we might discover as an outcome of inquiry rather than as an αρχή governing our inquiry from the outset". Borrowing terminology from Saussure and Derrida, Bryant gives the "Ontic Principle' in terms of a pre-critical encounter with a world of objects marked primarily by a positive affirmation of their significant "differences" (causes, interrelations and entailments among things to be finetuned in the course of inquiry itself). The nature of the textual object begins with this basic assumption (αρχή ) of the ontological (metaphysical) priority of significant differences in all discoverable 'things'. A 'thing' like a poetry text 'is' regardless of whatever's been said or thought about it, and so in that sense nothing's come before the text. A poetic text existing simpliciter is, upon encountering it, to make a significant 'difference' to the reader or it simply doesn't exist.

Thirdly, since a text is a "thing in itself" existing simpliciter, it's only one among a potentially myriad of things to which must be added the nonhuman, insensate, even robot objects. Bryant's completely undermined any notion of 'humanism' as a superordinate concept where Joy at least can entertain contrasting ideals. There's an unmistakable flattening of the metaphysical playing field here. In this radical 'posthumanity' objects live as 'ontic' equals, materially vital & meaningful to us and to each other only to the extent that they reveal their 'differences'. (We can set aside the technical aspects of this 'flat ontology' inference) What are the implications for literary criticism? Bryant may have provided his answer to that in the interesting "The Principle of Translation" section of "OP" where he states "there can be no object that is a mere vehicle for the acting differences of another object", destroying at a stroke the notion of authorial agency or any sense in which texts can serve as carriers of meaning. Tradition goes by the wayside. Since meanings cannot be transported through traditional avenues, literary transmission must be understood as a radicalization of the notion of 'affectivity' that's consonant with Bryant's "Year O" premise. More specifically,
‘translation’ should not be understood as a hermeneutic concept, but as an ontological concept.‘Transportation’ refers to the action of one object on another object. Not all transportations are of a causal variety, so it is important to employ terms capable of both capturing causality while allowing for other sorts of exercises of action. For example, the manner in which I am affected by a work of art differs from the manner in which a flower transports the differences of sunlight. And these manners of translating differences again differ from the manner in which the ocean transports the differences of the moon.
Fourthly, not just objects in the world but it follows from Bryant's 'onticology' that literary criticisms have been flattened as well. It makes no 'difference' to anyone whether the poem "Second Coming", for example, is seen as a carrier of competing interpretations until those differences are actually encountered. 'Code' is a word that's often used to designate both the agency & status of those properties in things with regards to which "manners of translating differences" can be registered. Alex Reid even goes so far as to give a literary reading the same ontical status as a "Google search spider", saying
Code is a characteristic that certain objects may have. It results from a particular kind of assemblage production. Other objects (e.g. humans) have the capacity to encode in their relations. This might mean literally marking a code or more abstractly naming objects. Clearly our encoding/naming of objects never fully captures them, but it can have an impact upon them, as when you name an animal your "food." In English Studies we use terms like "text" and "reading" quite liberally. This makes sense inasmuch as we encode the world we see and interact with that code. However, here I want to be more literal and think specifically about interactions between objects that are marked with codes and objects with the capacity to decipher those codes. So this could be a human reading a book, a Google search spider crawling this page, or a supermarket checkout counter scanning a bar code
 To call a reading of Yeats a literary interpretation in the first place, loaded as it will be with all the usual Yeatsian lore, is to trump "any differences that might be contributed by objects independent of language", by which Bryant might even mean Reid's "Google search spider". The differences in Yeatsian interpretation are not radical enough since any weighing of alternative readings will by nature privilege (or act as if it would like to privilege) one over another. Strictly literary readings of Yeats' poem—by which we mean one that's too human-centric & excludes its possible impact, say, on nonhuman objects, like robots— are too exclusive given the existence (as per the αρχή or the primary 'ontic' principle of an object-oriented ontology) of "inter-ontic relations or all interactions between objects", which is to say that in the act of translating "Second Coming" we exclude the possibility that the poem (enjoying the same 'ontic' status as the rest of the world) can just as materially translate us. An encounter with the 'differences' of Yeatsian poetry can spell changes from which we may never recover.

Here's a meeting of ontology and poetry that I find particularly interesting but insufficient. There are some problems with the SR/OOO as I've found it (and my reading of the literature has so far been rather limited), as well as some very real methodological strengths, that I'd like address in a future post. I'll need some time to familiarize myself more fully with 'critical realism' theory.

21 comments:

Anonymous said...

Conrad, I admire and applaud you for taking on this kind of thing (I typed "think" there but corrected it). I have to admit, though, that if I had to read many paragraphs such as the one you quote—the one that begins with "'translation' should not be understood as a hermeneutic concept, but as an ontological concept"—I would have to drive to the nearest bar and hammer down tequila shots until I could not lift my head from the bar. I always wonder why these brilliant people cannot write simple, clear English as opposed to the clotted jargon of their profession. I know it serves as shorthand in the faculty lounge, but it leaves the brain cells of the rest of us numb. If their ideas matter so much, if they are so insightful, so revolutionary, so useful, why don't they make the attempt to communicate them as widely as possible? I think I know what's at the root of it: they are afraid. They are afraid to state their ideas clearly because they—the ideas and the ideators—may not look so brilliant. At least that's my suspicion. I'm wondering if you might take this bit of "translation" on, since you obviously understand their notions and value "the Arnoldian humanist tradition." Can you do that? I mean, can you do a version of this post that purges the jargon from every sentence and states the case as Arnold might have done? My wife and my hapless bartender would both be in your debt.

Conrad DiDiodato said...

Joseph,

I hear you! I happen to understand the theory because so much of it is philosophy-based, and I have a fairly extensive familiarity with the stuff going all the way back to my university days. I've never really stopped reading philosophy because, given the trend in literary criticism, it's necessary to stay 'au fait' with the philosophical underpinnings of much poststructuralist poetics. To their credit SR/OOO theorists do make a pretty consistent presentation of views consonant with their primary sources.

However, language is undeniably a 'problem', for the most part inaccessible except to those with an interest in philosophy, particularly the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida, Deleuze (not exactly Oprah authors!). It is regrettable--and I completely agree with you here, and it's the source of my own difficulties with their theory--that they CANNOT express what is (to my mind)a very interesting take on the nature of 'textual objects'in a more reader-friendly fashion. It is a real problem for which an attempt to translate the arcane terminology into readable prose is the only remedy.

As you say, it is decidedly easier (and safer) to cloak oneself in impenetrable academic jargon than to give an understable presentation of views to the person in the marketplace. A colleague-friend of mine recently said to me in the early days of the church, it was common to hear the unlettered citizenry in the marketplace arguing passionately over the Triune god! The Church made a fairly abstruse doctrine of the Trinity that palatable to people who couldn't read a word of Augustine let alone Scripture.

I am planning to write a response to the theory in my next blog. Let me try to repharse SR/OOO theory here as best I can. I did overlook some the more technical aspects in my own blog presentation of the theory, if you can imagine it.

(a) to talk about 'textual objects' (poems, plays,histories, etc.) it's important to give an 'object-oriented' understanding of things. It's presumably easier to talk about the 'poem' as a thing (its ens, being)if you can grasp it somehow as you can anything else in the world, pet dogs, your bike, the environment, etc.without the need for intermediaries of authority, tradition, intellectual scaffolding of any sort. In place of 'vertical' hierarchizing sytem we posit a 'flat' ontology that means any 'space'-- conceptual, religious, sexual, even metaphysical--perceived to come between you and the 'thing' out there instantly vaporizes.

(b)'Being's' been radically concretized since it's no longer valid to talk about a 'thing' (substance) and its attributes. The thing 'is' directly to the extent that its perceivable qualities are seen as differing both from you and everything else. But this is not a 'difference'-'sameness' opposition (binary). Without 'conceptual' buffers (like ideas, tradition)you are 'ontologically' the same as everything else so that perceivers engage with the world every bit as much as the world engages with perceivers. A directly seen thing exists the second it presents itself as something 'different' from you. To engage with the world is to engage with yourself: everything you do, think, feel even in regards to what's outside of you will radically change you, too (Do you see the appeal of this to radical environmentalism?)

(c)'Traditional notions of humanism go by the wayside, of course. Nothing can come before it: how can it under the rubric of an 'object-oriented ontology'? The text's been radically deracinated, conceived as a living viable artifact only to the degree you and everything else in the world can interact with and fundamentally change it.

Ed Baker said...

OH!!

NOW I GET "it"!!!


The t h i n g "is"
right there in

plnain/plain/pleine
view simply & merly
accuse this .... thing

de:finds it s OWN FORM ?

.... after The Fact?

hells, bells d.i.n.g:

as Kandinsky put it to "it" in 1910:

"art(/poetry) consists of only two
elements:
The Inside & The Outside."

( Jo:seph; meet y'all at that saloon
(the one where everyboddhi
knows my name & where "she"

hustles drinks


( hey Conrad.... anybody Intelligent, besides me an Joe,
following/reading this?

Conrad DiDiodato said...

Ed,

I think we're it....for now.

John B-R said...

Conrad, I have a very long response to this (as you might imagine, which I'll send via email (it would never fit here). What I will say here is that I don't see a single clotted word in "'translation' should not be understood as a hermeneutic concept, but as an ontological concept" - in fact that's an utterly clear sentence. But I don't want to argue the point. I just want to mention an OOO text that is incredibly reader-friendly: Graham Harman's Circus Philosophicus. Harman in particular takes great pride in being reader-friendly. But I should add, it is one of the tenets of the "OOO generation" to eschew the baroque presentations of the "not exactly Oprah authors" you name.

Ed, you wrote:

OH!!

NOW I GET "it"!!!


The t h i n g "is"
right there in

plnain/plain/pleine
view

Not exactly. No one thing every encounters another thing whole. Every encounter is partial. Which doesn't mean that experience is partial, it means that we only expose certain aspects of ourself to any other object, and are only exposed to certain of its aspects.

Conrad, email to follow.

Conrad DiDiodato said...

Thanks, John,

will read with interest. Perhaps I could post your responses here, with your kind permission?

Anonymous said...

“It's presumably easier to talk about the 'poem' as a thing ... if you can grasp it somehow as you can anything else in the world, pet dogs, your bike, the environment, etc. without the need for intermediaries of authority, tradition, intellectual scaffolding of any sort.”

Poems are not objects in the way that dogs and bikes are objects, are they? It seems to me their “intermediaries” are built in. Every poem uses a particular word-hoard (to quote Robin Skelton); the word-hoard is part of a cultural heritage and the use of it in poetry exists in the context of a tradition. The “intellectual scaffolding” is also built in: semantically, syntactically, metaphorically, musically. (I’m just rereading Louis Macneice’s “Autumn Journal,” the second section of which begins with the line: “Spider, spider, twisting tight.” He summons Blake into the poem without alluding to anything but the syntactical form of his Tyger poem.) Not only not easy for a the reader to grasp a poem as an object, it is impossible—because every poem embodies its own intermediaries. 

“Without 'conceptual' buffers (like ideas, tradition) you are 'ontologically' the same as everything else so that perceivers engage with the world every bit as much as the world engages with perceivers. A directly seen thing exists the second it presents itself as something 'different' from you.”

This seems to imply that things in the world don’t exist outside my perception of them as different from me. I must be misreading you. 

“The text's been radically deracinated.”

Yes—it has been torn up by the roots. This is how we know the approach is probably wrong.

“[The text] is conceived as a living viable artifact only to the degree you and everything else in the world can interact with and fundamentally change it.”

Neither my dog nor my bike nor a stone nor a house plant can “interact” with a poem. Only human beings can interact with it. And each human being brings his or her own understanding to it—but that understanding doesn’t change the poem itself. The poem, in addition to everything else it does, encodes the author’s intention. For example, let’s say there’s a traditional Tagalog folksong whose first line is structured exactly like the first line of Blake’s Tyger poem. A native Tagalog speaker who learns English but never reads Blake happens upon Macneice’s poem; he reads the Spider line and thinks, “Well—this Irish fellow must be alluding to the Tagalog folk tradition.” (There’s a Ph.D in it for him if he follows up on this.) But of course Macneice had no knowledge of the Tagalog folksong. The Tagalog reader may never be able to read the line without making the folksong association, but it is not in the poem because it was not in the poet’s knowledge-hoard. This probably sounds like an old-fashioned argument, but it’s true. What a poem is depends at least as much on the poet’s knowledge-hoard as on the reader’s. Otherwise one could never misread a poem—and we would have to say that Charlie Manson’s reading of “Helter Skelter” as a song about a coming race war was a legitimate interpretation. No, no—readings and misreadings and failures to read at all do not change the poem.

Now that I’ve ranted—am I understanding you correctly?

Ed Baker said...

now that you've 'ranted' .. are you
under standing correctly?

I am telling you that
if you (reader) understand
my poetry OR art
the

I am not doing my correct job correct ly...

a mere hint of (an image of) "her with the red lips"
in poem or painting
just doesn't
ever have as yet
kisssssssed me juicy

as I pleaded.

as for my "me" and as for my "me's" productions/results?

niter one of US are

re-sponsible for any pos
sinle anyone else's

understandings/experiences
or
intelligence:

such-as-it-is
the poem does what
the words do


&
the painting does

what
the paint does.

a slight hint of an image
merely
provokes the
possibilities

& so what if
I get stuck ?

I can just add into
"it"
a Snake to/too

complicate and simplify

my own/owned mythoses?

Conrad DiDiodato said...

Joseph,

you and I are of one mind on the "knowledge-hoard" requirement of which tradition, technique, a work's allusiveness are all vital components.

But to SR/OOO theory the idea is anathema: if any kind of dog-poet interrelation (as 'ontic entities')cannot be envisaged, literary judgements just simply don't exist. It's their idea of 'things', almost done to death in their post-Husserlian and Deleuzian analyses,that's problematical to me. And it's my biggest objection to SR/OOO theory in general: the argument's a "begging of the question" since everywhere, from statement of 'object-oriented' theory to application, they ultimately try to appeal away from what the 'text' (poem)is to its uses as carriers of 'difference'. They're left with the assertion that to be is to be different from everything else (which sounds childish) Since they haven't gotten a real handle on it, they are left (as you've said)with absurd claims like things can't exist unless they're perceived by something/someone (Didn't Bishop Berkeley mean the same by his famous "esse est percipi") Everything's purely "relational" event to them.

Alex Reid in a recent "digital digs" posts says of this human-text interaction,"here I want to be more literal and think specifically about interactions between objects that are marked with codes and objects with the capacity to decipher those codes. So this could be a human reading a book, a Google search spider crawling this page, or a supermarket checkout counter scanning a bar code." A Google search spider's reading of a Tagalog folksong is as good as yours!And note also Reid's use of 'codes', presumably what you and I would call 'meanings', 'traditions',etc

Conrad DiDiodato said...

Ed,

I like

" &
the painting does

what
the paint does.

a slight hint of an image
merely
provokes the
possibilities"

I can't imagine a Google web crawler provoking artistic possibilities in this way: does it not pre-establish artistic intention, skill, experience, etc.

It seems to me SR/OOO theory is not so much a way to recognize nonhuman interractions (with the possibility of 'uploading' the human into machines one day so that a vanGogh can walk the earth again): it looks to me anti-human, too. A disparagement of the idea of human perfectibility, progress and enlightenment, humanist ideals, of course, that they've trashed.

John B-R said...

Joseph, I'm going to chime in here, not to try to get your goat but just to give a different perspective. And please note that in all of this I;'ve been committed, utterly commented to making poems for about 45 years. So I certainly don't undervalue them.

First, you write: "Poems are not objects in the way that dogs and bikes are objects, are they?" Yes and no. Yes in that each has a history that makes it what it is (for a poet's word and culture hoard think a dog's DNA, domestication, breeding, history of pets etc. You can draw up your own list for a bike). And that once created a poem or a bike exist physically in the world and have interactions with other existing objects. No, inasmuch as each object or kind of object enters into its own finite set of possible relations with all other objects. A bike doesn't have a word hoard, so it will interact differently with a human mind than a poem; but a poem doesn't have wheels, so it will interact differently than a poem will with a street.

Second, you write: "a directly seen thing exists the second it presents itself as something 'different' from you.” This seems to imply that things in the world don’t exist outside my perception of them as different from me. I must be misreading you." I don't know whether you're misreading Conrad, but this is a misread of OOO. The sentence should be rewritten as ""a directly seen thing exists ***for you*** the second it presents itself as something 'different' from you, ***but even if it never presents itself to you (e.g. the back sie of the moon) it still exists, utterly independent of even the possibility of an observer.***”

Third, you write: "but that understanding doesn’t change the poem itself. The poem, in addition to everything else it does, encodes the author’s intention." Let's take a few examples. 1) Homer. It is known that the Catalogue of the Ships was used by Greeks of the classical post-Homeric period to settle border diputes. I would bet anything that Homer's intention did not include the notion that his poem would be considered a geography (it's not necessarily relevant her that Homer may be the name of a tradition). It's a very serious question whether something is changed by the way it's used. 2) Milton, Paradise Lost. It is extraordinarily difficult to know **how** tie the poem to the failure of the civil war and protectorate. Therefore, whatever Milton's intentions might have been, they remain undecidable, So it falls to the reader (who always brings her own "hoard" to the reading) to make the connection, and that does indeed change the poem. Unless you are simply saying that a poem is nothing but the words of which it is made (which would reduce the significance of the hoard quite severely).

I will end by asking you to discuss further what you have in mind by "an unchangeable poem" (muy quotes, not yours. The important things for me is not to be right, but to increase my understanding.

John B-R said...

Conrad, you write: "But to SR/OOO theory the idea is anathema: if any kind of dog-poet interrelation (as 'ontic entities')cannot be envisaged, literary judgements just simply don't exist."

Well, simply, and probably true, a dog cannot make literary judgments. But I don't know how it follows that therefore no entity is capable of making literary judgments.

Ypu also write: "they ultimately try to appeal away from what the 'text' (poem)is to its uses as carriers of 'difference'."

I don't see how looking at a poem as a carrier of difference is appealing away from what a poem is. I mean, isn't a poem a carrier of difference? And don't poems have uses (I mean, isn't Arnoldian humanism making the assumption that a literature can better (make different) a person?)

Moving to OOO, you assert that "they are left (as you've said)with absurd claims like things can't exist unless they're perceived by something/someone (Didn't Bishop Berkeley mean the same by his famous "esse est percipi") Everything's purely "relational" event to them."

Exactly the opposite is true. The basic tenet of OOO is the very non-idealist "everything exists whether or not it's perceived." And there's a tremendous years-long argument re: relations vs objects, in which most OOO people come down on the side of objects, since object can (theoretically) exist without relations to any other objects) but relations cannot exist without objects to relate to each other. In fact, one of Harman's major critiques with Ladyman and Ross's everything must go is that L&R ultimately posit that all that actually exist are relations (his other major criticism is L&R's reductionism ...)

I think that you and Joseph need to go over to Google books and look at some of Eileen Joy's work, and while you're at it, look at some Timothy Morton, a romanticist instad of a medievalist ... I think their reading will surprise you ...

John B-R said...

Finally, for today at least, you write: "it looks to me anti-human, too. A disparagement of the idea of human perfectibility, progress and enlightenment, humanist ideals, of course, that they've trashed."

I think, I truly think, if anyone has trashed those ideals, it's humans themselves, not, strictly speaking, a philosophical movement. Let's see: since Arnold wrote: terrible terrible racist imperialism that's destroyed at least one continent, terrible relations between capital and labor, virtually infinite and endless warfare, at least half a dozen genocides, utterly irreparable environmental destruction, the sixth great extinction ...

I don't think you can blame skepticism about human perfectibility, progress and enlightenment on a few scattered academics and philosophers ...

As Eileen has made perfectly clear, what we need is a better and more robust humanism; the c19 version just doesn't seem to cut it ... not even close.

Conrad DiDiodato said...

John,

thanks, again, for the comments. I'll respond (hopefully satisfactorily)to each of your points.

Firstly, I've just ordered Harman and Bhaskar (Bryant's "Democracy of Objects" is online in PDF). From what I've read online, however,I don't know that one more interpretation of Heideggerian "the event of language" (Sprachereignis)or "happening of the word" (Wortgeschehen) will win me over, and I come to philosophic texts with a pretty open mind.I see all too clearly the problems in a 'critical realist'interpretation of textuality that I feel is attributable to a misreading of their Heideggerian & Deleuzian sources, which really amounts to a misunderstanding of 'textuality' in their own writings. The premises of SR/OOO, I maintain, do not stray one iota from the poststructuralist sources they use so freely. For example, Deleuze in "A Thousand Plateaus" develops his notion of 'bodies' and 'words' in terms of "fluid forces, flows, air, light and matter", with presumably a view of both matter and language (and other assemblages)coexisting on the same "plane of consistency". It is from this that SR/OOO theorists take their view that "relations cannot exist without objects", a state of the world's noumenal nature.

And since they've really strayed from their sources, they have to supply an answer to the question, What is the text? without at the same time resorting to a Saussurean/Derridean language of 'differences' nor proposing a strictly Deleuzian view of "matter as limitless corporeality". And since they cannot do the one (What is x) without necessarily giving us the other, viz. standard SR/OOO or Critical Realism theory as per Bryant,Joy, Harman, et al,they sorrowfully beg the question.

As I've already said at "Larval Subjects" in regards to Joy's comments (and it bears repeating here), "It’s hard to get a handle on that notion of texts as “autonomous entities” and appreciate the nature of their contributions to literary discussions without saying what exactly is the nature of the text in the first place. In a proposition like “x is a text if and only if x is an “object” or “artifact” (in your sense) of which it is true that, given a changing historical milieu of authors, readers and cultural technologies, x can be expected to “contribute autonomous differences of their own” (in Joy’s sense) to reflect that changing historical milieu”, we do seem to be getting the changes but no appreciable basis on which they can occur.

Again, SR/OOO have not given us something to replace the Arnoldian notion of the text as a carrier of significant cultural meaning. Am I surprised that supposed 'medievalists' don't walk the talk anymore? Not at all. The ideal of interdisciplinarity has made subject disciplines so porous as to be hardly recognizable. A theory like SR/OOO is riddled with holes wide enough to allow anything to pass. Recall Reid's point about the Google spider reading poetry. Current humanities theory has applications to just about everything, it seems (cybernetics, systems theory, queer studies, postmodern poetics, news/media studies, etc etc), without regard anymore to time bound notions of tradition,theory, text. And now it seems even fairly sophisticated science theory is up for grabs. A medievalist or media theorist really oughtn't to be appropriating subject disciplines they don't understand.

Ed Baker said...

have jus' a moment ago
via this 'xplination'/de:finition

formulated Absolutely Mathamatically
into it s OWN Set Theory

which The Calculess takes "us" far in to
The Empty Set

that (also) includes?

so for those who don't re:call what SR/000
is:

http://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2010/07/23/brief-srooo-tutorial/

as for what is the value of/in "x" o (even)r" x"+1

we'll be able to definitely tell in 9ine moths hence!




do read this

Conrad DiDiodato said...

John,

in response to your second post to me, I agree that Joy (to her credit) is prepared to admit that traditions can stray and then supposedly get back on track. Recall my point about Hirsch's acid replies to Derrida/deconstruction theory in his book, there even going so far as to attribute historical Shoahs to deconstructive thinking in general. Here's the exact inverse of your Arnold/ 'brutal English imperialism' analogy. I'd gladly join the call to return to a "robust humanism" because at least we're thinking about the same thing.

Again,to problematize the text out of existence without at the same time having to resort to a Saussurean/Derridean language of 'differences' or proposing a strictly Deleuzian view of "matter as limitless corporeality" is what they have to do but don't. They assume they've got something to problematize (something they took wholesale from poststructuralism) and they then proceed to some pretty ingenious rereadings of Husserl/Heidegger to do it. Rather than superseding the text they just step around it. And by god! SR/OOO has done just that.

Joseph is right to lament the essential unintelligibility of much of this 'critical realist' theory. I suspect (as he does) that if stated in more language-friendly terms the theory would look rather wobbly indeed. Even Heidegger's Time & Being reads fairly comfortably if someone takes the trouble to define some key terminology to you. Husserl's the same. Derrida,too. Theory of any kind ought to be accessible to an intelligent readership.

John B-R said...

Conrad, OK, I studied history of the book and editing when I was in grad school and I had the same problem with a certain bit of vocabulary they used that you use, too.

And that is "the text". I've never understood what was meant by "the text." I've only understood what was meant by this text and that text, and that other text over there. There seemed something so platonic about their usage, and, unless I'm misunderstanding you (which I well may be doing) yours. Yes, OOO does not believe (and I do not believe) in any such "thing" as a platonic text which all existing texts are reflections of ... poor reflections of. So, maybe you can explain it to me: what is "the" text?

Also: you write: "I don't know that one more interpretation of Heideggerian "the event of language" (Sprachereignis)or "happening of the word" (Wortgeschehen) will win me over,". One thing OOO is NOt is another interpretation of that aspect of Heidegger; to the degree reinterprets Heidegger, it's in his discussion of the tool (a hammer, specifically), not anything linguistic. BUT: Whether or not SR/OOO strays from pomo roots is certainly not of importance to me. What I do want to understand this: you write "It is from this that SR/OOO theorists take their view that "relations cannot exist without objects" as if there's something wrong with that. If there can be relations without objects, please explain that. I don't quite get what relations without objects would be, or what such relations would relate ... I don't even know how to ask the question any better than that.

But here's where I think we have the biggest communications problem. You write: "Again, SR/OOO have not given us something to replace the Arnoldian notion of the text as a carrier of significant cultural meaning." I just don't see where that's lost. Even if you don't use the word meaning. Even if you use the word affect (how can a text have affect if it doesn't carry cultural "baggage" - and I mean baggage in the best sense). Or difference that effects and affects. Seriously, I don't see where text as a carrier of all that is lost, any more than I see that a match defined as an object is now incapable of fire.

I'll address your next response separately.

John B-R said...

Conrad, one paragraph for each of yours:

1) no argument vis-a-vis the ability of any writer/person/critic/philosopher/theorist to fuck up. The thing I like about philosophy is the same thing I like about poetry: it's a human product, and humans are obviously imperfect, to put it mildly. (Sometimes, sadly, I pray we never get off this planet and I actually root for global warming)

2) the best way I have to address this is to note that I need you to help me understand what's meant by "the" text.

3) You write: "Joseph is right to lament the essential unintelligibility of much of this 'critical realist' theory. ... Theory of any kind ought to be accessible to an intelligent readership." I don't buy the unintelligibly bit - which doesn't mean that there aren't bad writers, it just means that I don't buy the general unintelligibility of 'theory'. Why not? Because of your 2nd sentence. I'm pretty much your average intelligent reader with no special training in any sort of theory (I'm 99% autodidact when it comes to any philosophy after Descartes - I did read a decent amount of classical philosophy and even some mediaval philosophy at school. But no Leibniz, no Kant, just a wee bit of Hegel, in connection to Marx, no Whitehead, no Bergson, no Vienna School, no Wittgenstein, no Heidegger, and certainly, when I was in school, 99% of all French theory was still in French and barely if at all known in the US - I got my BA in 72.). And - no false modesty here - I've met lots and lots of people smarter than me. And I more or less understand this stuff. QED, right? I mean, it doesn't seem any harder than reading Zukofsky's "A", for instance, of Pound's Cantos, or The Wasteland, etc.

In fact (bonus paragraph) the first place I encountered the word postmodern was when I was an architectural drafter in the mid-70s, and it was in the context of Robert Venturi, Charles Jencks, etc. It had nothing to do with literature, nor did I realize it could. ...

Conrad DiDiodato said...

John,

if I read my Heidegger aright (and I've got it open in front of me: Chapter III: "The Worldhood of the World")'tool'or 'equipment' is stated in his analysis of objects around us in the world with which we have to do in work, a state of being characterized as their "readiness-to-hand" (zuhanden)But "being-there" is Heidegger's chief metaphysical category ("Dasein"). The very knowledge of the World is at stake even in the discussion of things like tools that are "ready-to-hand". Therefore the discussion of any object in the World (tools, texts)must always be referenced ultimately to the problematics of Being. And what is "Being and Time" if not a grand definition of what the "thing" (tool, texts) is.

Everything's open for "circumspective concern",even the world of 'tools'. What Heidegger calls "the context of equipment" is a totality that can be grasped as an ontological concept beforehand: ontical things (tools) can only be grasped within a totality of Being itself. This is one of the ways in which the world announces itself. The 'tool' as the 'ready-to-hand' is already "in the 'there' before anyone has observed or entertained it."

We do start with tools (the world of objects 'ready-to-hand')as conspicuous, obtrusive and obstinate facts of our working lives that can't be denied: however,as things "in themselves" they reveal a solicitousness towards the World that is their primary concern. Their proper ontological signification reveals itself only when the same tools lie idle.

There can be no bypassing of Worldhood of the World any more than of the ontical status of things (as equipment, things "ready-to-hand").And yet that's precisely what Harmon and his followers do.

Harmon wilfully denies the "ontological status" of tools by rejecting any theory or praxis distinction: saying rather that "tools" reside (in Harmon's own words) in a " dark subterranean reality" cut off from precisely the "circumspective concern" analysis Heidegger gives to establish them, "things" now cut off from both themselves and humans.Instead of objects and the world (Heidegger)there are only "objects and relations"(Harman). And why? Because Harman says Heidegger got his ontology wrong and because Harman says so. Bring on the "guerrila metaphysicians"!Now's the time to mow down metaphysical speculation after Heidegger!

Of course, Harmon also claims to be able to do away with even Heideggerian 'time' and 'being' itself. Now mind you it's okay to disagree but something else must be put in its place, and that after a great deal of close textual analysis of the disputed texts. Anyone who claims Heidegger never really meant to separate theory from praxis, for example, has got to reread his Heidegger

John B-R said...

Happy new year, Conrad!

I think Harman would be the first to agree that Heidegger would shudder at the way Harman is reading him. Actually Harman acknowledges as much.

What the OOO people really want is to counter the "claustrophobia" and anthropocentrism of most post-Kantian philosophy, including the "everything is text" of poststructuralism. Whether they succeed is another matter.

I am not a philosopher. I read philosophy and poetry the same way. I don't expect total success in either realm. Or even partial success. I don't even think those are the proper terms in which to think about writing and reading. Writing and reading are human traces (sorry, a Derridean word).

And I want to know how other humans are feeling and how they're making it thru this life.

So, in the end, I find features of OOO very attractive (I do find the alternatives claustrophobic) - but I'm the last person to ask whether it succeeds in building a world (sorry, Heidegger). I think my arguments on its behalf have come their their sorry end.

But that doesn't mean our discussion has.

I do buy the notion that texts have affects; some of these are generated by their concepts, some are generated by their patterns of rhythm, sound, some are philological, etc etc. Some are generated by the tradition(s). Some are generated by their failures and inconsistencies. Et cetera.

There are two reasons to read: one is because it's affective (I am moved by the things I read). The other is that I might learn something (tools for living, like D&G's concepts). These reasons precede Arnold: Horatian "instruct and delight." I think the tools for living thing is pretty Arnoldian, in that those tools are to help us live better.

And yes, there are very impassioned arguments as to what better means.

As I think back on this discussion, I believe my whole argument here has been that there are no strictly literary readings, that all reading is is bastardized and the result of the miscegenations of the various cultural economic theoretical ideological spheres in which we live.

What I still don't understand is your assertion that that position is wrong, and that there is a strictly literary way to read and that if that is transgressed, the whole humanistic project (however defined; and yes I do think posthumanism and antihumanism and nihilism and "the democracy of objects" thing are in fact part of the whole humanist project, attempts to extend it past it's earlier failures and blind spots).

And I still don't understand what you mean by standards (we've never gotten to that discussion)

I'm perfectly willing to drag out my Heidegger, etc etc; this is fun; but I think we're drifting from our basic agon a bit ..

And, (bonus paragraph) even though I've written all my life, I'd be the last person to be able to give you a reason for writing. It's just something I do, like eating shitting sleeping etc. I know it's more willful than these, but I've never been able to untangle their roots. Maybe it's so I can leave a trace, tho I know very well that trace will be effaced before long (I have no illusions that I'm one of the immortals).

Maybe, and I think this is actually it, it's because I feel most alive when I write (kinda like Dr Johnson's man who is to be hung in the morning!)

So, let's accept that OOO has it's limits/problems/whatever, and go back to the original questions: what is a strictly literary reading and why is it the only one that is crucial?

I'm perfectly happy for you to restate this in your own way, if I've misunderstood you; but at least now you know how I have understood you.

Conrad DiDiodato said...

John,

Happy New Year to you and your family!

Yes, we've gotten off-track but I'm to blame for that. I really do think much is at stake in the SR/OOO trashing of the traditional literary text (pace Joy,Bryant) & the humanist tradition from which it comes. I've ordered the 'critical realism'books and will give them a read. My discussion with them is far from over. Nobody messes with my notions of poetic texts!

Yes, let's do revisit the original question:"what is a strictly literary reading and why is it the only one that is crucial?" And in this discussion I set my sights on Silliman and the New Sentence who've done to poetic language what SR/OOO have done to 'things'.

Have a great first day of 2012!